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ABSTRACT
Renewable energy generation depresses electricity spot prices, which is often used as argument
to justify incentives provided to renewables. In the so-called “merit-order effect”, renewable
power reduces the load available for conventional power and displaces higher marginal cost
generation out of the market.  In this study, we estimate the value of the “merit-order effect” due
to wind power generation in the Iberian market, in the period between 1st January 2008 and 31st
October 2016. This value, representing consumers’ potential cost savings, is compared with the
direct costs of the financial incentives in Portugal and in Spain.
The accumulated “merit-order effect” amount is estimated to be 26.1 billion €, whilst the total
values for the financial incentives reported is 23.9 billion €. The value of the “merit-order effect”
explains the existing lower returns by conventional generation and might have additional impacts
on future RES projects, subject to normal electricity market risks.
1.  Introduction
Electricity spot markets rank electrical energy suppliers
through the so-called “merit-order” of generators,
depending on their marginal costs. Renewable energy
source electricity generation (henceforth referred to as
RES-E), having high capital costs and small operational
costs, generate as much electrical energy as the applicable
renewable resource available, depressing electricity spot
prices significantly [1]. 
The changes in the European electricity systems are
profound and ongoing. New challenges arise from the
high level penetration of RES-E, both in the technical
sense and in the market design, due to the known RES-E
intermittency and non-dispatchability [2]. 
Simultaneously, electricity markets in Europe are being
restructured in face of a number of European policies
intending to guarantee the supply of electricity, reduce
costs, foster competition, ensure security of supply and
protect the environment [3]. Alongside, unbundling and
privatisation of the electricity supply industry has been
achieved in most of the EU Member States, together with
the creation of independent national regulatory agencies,
and introducing competition at the different market levels
[4]. Energy-only markets remunerate electrical energy,
based on the traded volume and price. Therefore,
increasing RES-E create a depression in spot electricity
prices, due to the “merit-order effect” of zero marginal
cost bidding, and diminishes the available load for the
remaining non-zero bidding technologies [5].
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Lower spot electricity prices are often used as
argument to justify incentives provided to renewables;
however, a number of challenges are created related
with failure of investment signals, capital cost recovery
and other market design issues. Additionally, in most
cases, savings are not appropriated by consumers due to
the pass through of renewable incentives in electricity
bills. In the so called “merit-order effect”, renewable
power bids shift the aggregated supply curve to the
right, reducing the load available for conventional
power (the “residual load”) and displacing high
marginal cost generation out of the merit-order [6–8].
Therefore, the electricity wholesale market fails to
provide incentives to sustain adequate generation
capacity, the “missing money problem”. This “missing
money problem” not only impacts conventional
generation, but also renewables, if fully integrated in the
spot electricity market and exposed to market risks.
There is a financial transfer from the wholesale market
through the “merit-order effect” to end-consumer
savings. However, end-consumers bear the costs of
RES-E financial support mechanisms through additional
tax or directly in the electricity bill [6, 9–12]. Currently,
most of the RES-E projects are financed through some
kind of support mechanisms, such as, investment
subsidies, tax credits, low interest loans, feed-in tariffs
or feed-in premia (for a more comprehensive list and
description of the support mechanisms used, the reader
can refer to [13–16]).
In this study, we estimate the value of the “merit-order
effect” due to wind power generation in the Iberian
electricity market between the 1st of January 2008 and
31st of October 2016 and compare this value, which
represents consumers’ potential cost savings, with the
direct costs of the financial support mechanisms for
RES-E. The computation of the “merit-order effect” is
done by estimating the new clearance price and energy
quantities that would be achieved in the wholesale
electricity market in the absence of wind power. Our
methodology is based on real bids and on a simple
clearing price calculation, whilst Sensfuß et al. [6] used
simulated spot electricity prices through an agent-based
model and Felder [7] just established a methodology to
calculate the “merit-order effect”. Moreover, our
calculation was made for Iberia as an integrated spot
electricity market for a time span of almost 8 years.
Ultimately, the goal is to verify if the amounts transferred
from the wholesale electricity market are adequate to
finance the RES-E support mechanisms.
In Section 2 we present a literature review, followed
by the data and methods used in this study in Section 3.
The results obtained and associated analysis is presented
in Section 4 and a brief conclusion can be found in
Section 5.
2. Literature review
2.1. The rising importance of RES-E
The impact of RES-E financial support on end-
consumer electricity prices has been evaluated in several
studies without any common conclusions. For example,
in Australia, Gerardi and Nidras  [17] found that the
RES-E financial support decreased retail electricity
prices, whilst Roam Consulting [18] calculated an
increase of 5% in 2015. For some European Member
States, Silva and Cerqueira [10] estimated that an
increase of 1% in RES-E share of demand would
increase 1 to 1.8% end-consumers’ electricity price. For
Spain, Costa-Campi and Trujillo-Baute [19] found that,
at an aggregate level, an increase of about 9% in total
production under the FIT system leads to a fall of 2.61%
in the wholesale price and an increase of 4.35% in the
FIT cost, which results in a 0.042% increase in the
average retail price of final industrial consumers.
Europe’s ambitious target of 20% renewable energy
sources in 2020 (or 33% renewable energy sources for
electricity) prompted several member states to propose
highly attractive support mechanisms. Denmark,
Germany, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ireland, and Belgium,
for example, have seen their share of renewable energy
sources, mainly in wind and solar, increase drastically in
a few years.
Among all renewable energy sources, wind and solar
were the ones subject to the strongest research and
development, based on clusters established in some
regions of Europe. All these efforts required financial
instruments like feed-in tariffs, feed-in premia, fiscal
incentives, tax exemptions and other [14, 20–22]. These
financial instruments provided an initial incentive to
invest in non-mature RES-E technologies. 
One of the most successful examples of RES-E
incentive policies can be found in Denmark, where a
partnership between public and private institutions was
established [23]. After a strong energy policy shift,
Denmark managed to reach 20% RES-E share in 2008
[24, 25]. Since then, RES-E share in Denmark continued
to rise, reaching, in 2015, 41.4% of wind power and
13.8% of essentially biomass. This level of RES-E is
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possible due to the cross-border interconnections that
allow electricity trading in the Nord Pool and smooths
production profiles.
In Iberia, both Portugal and Spain had an outstanding
increase in wind power, whilst, in spite of the existing
solar potential in Portugal, only Spain developed
significantly solar power. Moreover, hydropower
generation share is historically high in Iberia. In
Germany, the “Energiewende” policy prescribed the end
of nuclear power and the growth of RES-E to replace
fossil generation. In result, Germany has currently the
largest wind and solar power in Europe with 40.5 GW
and 38.2 GW of installed capacity, respectively [26].
With the recent technology developments, wind and
solar power became mature. With decreasing investment
costs, the existing financial instruments became
obsolete. Furthermore, the financial burden of RES-E
incentives is significant and policies are being reviewed
throughout Europe. In Germany and Spain, for example,
actions were already taken to reduce RES-E financial
support [27, 28].
2.2. The Merit-order effect
Electricity trading in Europe is currently based on
several types of markets: exchanges or spot markets,
bilateral and over-the-counter markets, ancillary
services markets, and retail markets [29]. Presently,
electricity exchanges in Europe trade volumes of
electricity at a clearing price, matching supply and
demand. All market agents bidding lower than the
clearing price, trade their bidding volumes at that price.
These exchanges have day-ahead sessions for each of
the day period (usually for each of the 24 hours) and
intraday sessions to provide a first level for the electrical
system balance. The electricity market price clearance is
done for a specific geographical area, which depends not
only on national borders, but also in some cases on
internal transmission capacity, reflecting electricity flow
constraints and allowing for distinct price signals in each
area (e.g. Sweden with four bidding areas). In Europe,
spot electricity markets bidding areas are then joined
through a market coupling/splitting mechanism, where
bidding areas with lower prices export electricity to
markets with higher prices through the interconnections.
If the interconnection capacity is large enough to
accommodate the exported electricity flows (without
congestion), then the price is the same in both markets,
otherwise market splitting occurs and two regional
market prices are cleared [30].
On the supply side, the so-called “merit-order” of
generators depends on marginal costs of each market agent
bidding in the spot electricity market. These marginal
costs of market agents depend mainly on the generation
technology in their electricity production portfolio and
related operational costs [31]. Each generating plant
operational cost presents several components like fuel,
variable consumables, variable maintenance, emissions
and transmission costs. Generally, in the bottom of the
supply curve one can find market agents bidding
electricity produced with low marginal cost technologies,
like nuclear or hydro. This is the also the case of renewable
generation technologies with high capital costs and small
operational costs, which will produce as much electrical
energy as the applicable renewable resource
available [22]. Therefore, electricity spot prices are
significantly dependent on the available renewable
electrical energy in the market, given that renewable
power comes first in the merit-order, lowering spot
electricity prices and potentially causing zero, or even
negative, price periods in the case when demand is fully
covered [7, 32, 33].
Confirmation of the above is obtained through the
analysis of data extracted from the Iberian electricity spot
market (OMIE), from the 1st of July 2008 to the 15th of
March 2014, where the volume of bids at zero price is
found to be positively correlated with the available RES-E
power generation (correlation factor of 0.733 with a 95%
confidence interval [0.728, 0.737]), as seen in Figure 1.
Clearly, the spot electricity price is also correlated with
the volume of bids at zero price; however, negatively
(correlation factor of –0.413 with a 95% confidence
interval [–0.420, –0.406]), with significant amount of
market periods with zero spot electricity price (Figure 2),
confirming the statements of several authors  [7, 32, 34].
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Figure 1: OMIE electrical energy bids at zero [35] vs. renewable
power generation [29, 36, 37]
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Renewable power bids shift the aggregated supply
curve to the right and displace high marginal cost
generation out of the merit-order. This, as
abovementioned, is the so-called “merit-order effect”,
causing a reduction in the spot electricity price and
reducing the load available for conventional power, or
the so-called “residual load” [6–8]. The residual load is
positively correlated with the spot electricity price
(correlation factor of 0.553 with a 95% confidence
interval [0.547, 0.559]), as observed for the OMIE in
Figure 4. Figure 3 shows the aggregated supply and
demand plot for the hour with the highest RES-E
generated in Iberia in the considered data sample
extracted from the OMIE (28th January 2014, hour 20).
Considering the aggregated supply curves with, and
without RES-E bids, it is possible to compute the merit-
order effect, which for this hour alone amounted to
2.1 million Euros. 
Felder (2011) actually stated that by providing
incentives to “out-of-market” technologies, such as most
renewables, spot electricity prices would fall to zero.
Lower spot electricity prices are often used to justify the
incentives provided to RES-E; however, they create a
number of challenges related with the investment signals
and capital cost recovery. Additionally, wealth fails to
shift from producers to consumers [6, 9, 11], as in most
cases, savings are not obtained by consumers due to the
inclusion of renewable incentives in their electricity
bills.
Additional concerns and challenges of high
generation shares of RES-E are reported both in the
technical sense and in the market design [29]. On the
technical sense, it is possible to list the following:
generation variability and uncertainty, adequate
transmission capacity, flexibility and standby of
dispatchable generation, electrical system regulation
and frequency control, demand-side response, RES-E
curtailment, energy storage, adequate transmission
grid and cross-border interconnections [38–41].
Concerning the market design, one can enumerate
electricity market integration, cost allocation of
transmission grid and cross-border interconnections,
intraday and reserve power markets, RES-E financial
support schemes and capacity support mechanisms
[2, 40, 42, 43].
Vis-à-vis market design, the reduced residual load
and the depressed spot electricity prices, along with the
technical challenges and costs of peaking conventional
thermal power plants, are currently stressing utilities
income [44]. The failure of the market to provide
signals to investors for adequate generation capacity
levels is the so called “missing money problem”. This
“missing money problem” not only impacts
conventional generation, but might also affect RES-E
0 40 80 120
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
El
ec
tri
ca
l e
ne
rg
y 
bi
ds
 a
t z
er
o 
[M
W
h]
Spot electricity price [€ /MWh]
2008-07-01 to 2014-03-15
Figure 2: OMIE electrical energy bids at zero vs. spot electricity
price [29, 35]
Electrical energy [MWh]
2014-01-28 hour 20
Pr
ic
e 
[€
/M
W
h]
0 20000 40000 60000 80000
0
50
100
150
Figure 3: OMIE aggregated demand and supply curves (with RESE
bids - solid and without RES-E bids - dashed) [29, 35]
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Figure 4: OMIE residual electrical energy vs. spot electricity price
[29, 35]
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market integration, if exposed to normal market risks.
The development of RES-E to comply with the
increasing EU targets (45% RES-E generation share by
2030), might only be viable if market design is
carefully assessed and financial incentives kept,
notwithstanding reasonable levels depending on
technology maturity.
2.3. The challenge of market integration
With the incentives provided coming to an end or reduced
substantially, the renewables integration in the electricity
market and their subsequent exposure to market risks
becomes a prominent issue. It is unanimous throughout
the literature that flexibility is the key to obtain an
efficient electricity market with high levels of renewable
generation. In the literature several strategies to achieve
this flexibility are proposed: implementation of a
premium system to allow RES-E to recover investment;
implement demand-side response; develop storage
technologies; integrate spot, balancing and ancillary
electricity markets; improve grid flexibility through
reinforcing transmission and distribution networks;
flexible and efficient generation mix; capacity guarantee
mechanisms; subsidies for electrification of transport and
heating [29, 33]. Policy makers should tailor the mix of
strategies that fits best each regional specificity. 
3. Data & methods
Real bid data was extracted for electricity offers and
demand from the OMIE website [35], from the 1st of
January 2008 until the 31st of October 2016.
Furthermore, wind power generation was obtained from
Redes Energéticas Nacionais [36] and Red Eléctrica de
España [37], for the same period.
A new equilibrium for electricity price and quantity
that would be achieved in the wholesale Iberian
electricity market in the absence of wind power is
estimated to obtain the “merit-order effect”. Figure 6
illustrates this in a stylised way where we can observe the
difference in supply curves, with and without wind
power electricity, solid and dashed lines respectively.
Without wind power generation, the supply curve shifts
to the left, causing an increase of the market clearing
price. The consumer surplus is thus increased with higher
wind power in the wholesale electricity marginal market
and the “merit order effect” is the difference between
both consumer surpluses, with and without wind power.
A simplified clearing price algorithm, without
considering interconnection congestion, market splitting
or grid constraints, is used to re-calculate the spot
electricity market quantities and price. This algorithm is
used to calculate a simplified clearing price with all the
bids extracted from the OMIE electricity spot exchange.
This initial clearing price is then compared with a
second clearing price, considering the absence of wind
power, therefore a higher price depending on the amount
of wind power bids found in each particular hour. This
simplified algorithm might present some limitations,
namely the calculated price does not follow the
algorithm used in the OMIE, therefore, clearing prices
will certainly be different from the obtained in the real
spot market. In fact, the restrictions imposed in the real
spot price calculation increase the price in relation to the
simple matching of supply and demand bids (Figure 5).
Nevertheless, given that our objective is to find price
and energy quantity relative differences, the assumed
simplification may be acceptable.
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Figure 5: Electricity spot prices (simple clearing – solid and OMIE
algorithm – dashed)
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Figure 6: Aggregated demand and supply curves (with wind 
power – solid and without wind power – dashed)
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The “merit-order effect” is then calculated for each
hour of the considered data sample, following Felder,
(2011) and Sensfuß et al., (2008) through the following
equation:
(1)
where, (Q0, P0) is the estimation of the initial market
equilibrium energy and price with all market bids (thus,
including wind power) and (Q1, P1) the estimation of the
new market equilibrium energy and price considering all
market bids with the exception of wind power bids (thus,
without wind power). Consequently, a consumer surplus
difference is calculated (the reader should bear in mind
that these consumers are wholesale market agents, e.g.
electricity retailers or big industrial consumers).
The financial cost of wind power financial incentives
is also computed and then compared with the “merit-order
merit order effect
P P Q P P Q Q
=
− + − −( ) ( )( )1 0 1 1 0 0 1
1
2hour∑
effect”. The annual average wind power financial
incentives in Portugal and in Spain are inhere used.
These incentives are calculated based on the annual total
amount paid to wind power divided by the total wind
generation. Therefore, the estimation of the amounts
spent in wind power financial incentives in each hour, is
calculated based on the hourly wind power generation in
each country, multiplied by the annual average values
for the financial incentives (Table 1). The incentives are
reported by each country energy regulatory agency, i.e.,
ERSE in the Portuguese case [45] and CNMC in the
case of Spain [46].
4. Analysis and Results
The estimation of the “merit-order effect” was made for
each hour of the considered data sample. This is illustrated
in Figure 7 where it is observed that the calculated clearing
price without the wind power bids is higher than the one
calculated with all the bids. An expected negative
Table 1: Wind power average financial incentives in Euros/MWh [45, 46]
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Portugal 94.70 93.70 91.60 93.50 96.60 93.90 93.46 94.11 96.28
Spain 100.41 80.09 78.01 87.38 84.83 77.23 58.95 70.7 53.45
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Figure 7: Electricity market clearing prices with and without wind power
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correlation between the “merit-order effect” and the
residual load (in our study the residual load is assumed to
be the load without wind power) was confirmed
(Figure 8), supporting the “merit-order effect” theory. This
is corroborated by the positive correlation found between
the “merit-order effect” and wind power (Figure 9).
By adding all the discounted “merit-order effect” of the
hours considered in the sample, the accumulated “merit-
order effect” amount is estimated to be 26.1 billion €
(annual amounts are presented in Table 2). All amounts
were discounted back to the year 2008 using the 3 months
Euribor interest rate (daily rates obtained from
Datastream [47]). The value of the “merit-order effect”
represents the increasing wholesale consumer surplus and
explains the decreasing returns by conventional
generation. The decreasing returns obtained by wholesale
electricity suppliers may also impact future RES projects,
which might be subject to normal electricity market risks.
The increasing surplus observed in the wholesale
electricity market does not necessarily mean that the retail
end-consumers obtain savings. In this study, the amount
of wind power financial incentives throughout the
considered sample period is estimated to be 23.9 billion €,
which is lower than the calculated “merit-order effect”.
This result is confirmed by previous similar analysis
conducted in the literature, in particular, with respect to
Spain [19, 48, 49], with respect to Germany [6] and to
several EU countries [10].
5. Conclusion
The lower wholesale electricity prices are used quite
often as argument in favour of RES-E. In fact, the
“merit-order effect” created by renewable generation
and associated lower spot electricity prices, is often used
to justify the incentives provided and according to the
results obtained, the value estimated for the financial
incentives is lower than the merit-order effect. However,
in most cases, savings are not obtained by end
consumers due to the inclusion of general RES costs in
electricity bills [6, 9–11]. Additionally, a number of
challenges are created related with the failure of
investment signals and capital cost recovery, causing the
so called “missing money problem”. The missing money
problem not only impacts conventional generation, but
also renewables, if integrated in the spot electricity
market and exposed to normal market risks. Without
financial support and with the depressed short-term
marginal pricing from an “energy-only” market, capital
cost recovery would be problematic. Thus, investment in
renewables can be at risk, depending on the continued
existence of financial incentives. Additionally, end-
consumers have to support the additional costs created
by the incentives to wind power and renewables in
general.
In this study, we conducted the analysis considering
the fully integrated Iberian electricity system and not
Portugal and Spain separately. Also, this article
constitutes a longer-term analysis than those currently
available in the literature, which is an important aspect
to consider as RES-E incentives promote producers’
investments with long term contracts, having financial
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Figure 9: Wind power load vs. “merit-order effect”
Table 2 – Annual calculated merit-order effect [million Euros 2008]
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Merit-order effect 2920 2127 2617 2627 3182 3974 3616 3198 1901
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implications to the electricity market. It is demonstrated
that the wholesale consumer surplus increase is higher
than the financial incentives provided to wind power
generation. A proper market design would transmit
these benefits to end-consumers.
However, the existing electricity market design is not
providing the necessary signals to investors, creating an
uncertain future with respect to adequate available
generation capacity. Policy makers have to address this
issue adequately, either by prolonging financial
incentives to renewables (in spite of the recognized
maturity), capacity payments to dispatchable power
generation, or by any other design change to provide
adequate signals for existing and new generation
capacity, renewable or not. Debate is ongoing between
all stakeholders and needs to be completed, otherwise a
supply capacity shortage can be reached in the near
future, endangering the required security of supply. 
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